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Summary. This paper analyzes an exchange conomy in which several assets erve 
as stores of value and where agents have completely heterogeneous preferences and 
endowments. It describes the set of perfect foresight equilibria in which all assets 
have positive prices. There are international policies with determinate exchange 
rates if the world economy satisfies a strong efficiency criterion. Also, the corre- 
sponding equilibrium allocations are in the core of the world economy for certain 
international policies. Hence, a system of fixed exchange rates can support efficient 
allocations to the extent that countries agree on a division of seigniorage in the 
creation of international reserves. 
1. Introduction 
One of the most celebrated results in the theory of international finance is that the 
equilibrium exchange rate is indeterminate in models of overlapping enerations 
with several assets. Using a stationary model, Kareken and Wallace [19] showed 
that for any exchange rate there was a unique equilibrium in which all currencies and 
goods traded freely and that each exchange rate had real effects. ~ The purpose of this 
paper is to develop this insight more deeply; using Malinvaud's [21] strong 
criterion, we explore the relationship between exchange rates and the efficiency of 
equilibrium allocations in a wide class of economies. 
Most analyses of dynamic efficiency focus on a sequence of homogeneous agents, 
but economies with one representative agent per generation miss the essence of 
international economics: trade between countries. Of course, allocations are efficient 
if and only if: (i) there is no feasible reallocation among the agents of any one 
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board, the 1990 meetings ofthe Western Economic Association, the University of Western Ontario, the 
University of Chicago, the University of Pennsylvania, Purdue University, and Victoria University of 
Wellington for comments on earlier drafts. 
1 Kareken and Wallace restrict their attention to what Gale [16] calls Samuelsonian equilibria; hence, 
their esult is not as general s has been widely believed. 
generation that makes one person better off without hurting any other; and (ii) there 
is no such feasible reallocation between the agents of different generations. 
The primary contribution of this paper is that, for certain configurations of 
country-specific generational deficits, considerations ofeconomic efficiency elimin- 
ate the generic multiplicity of exchange rates. By imposing a strong efficiency 
criterion, we show that one vector of exchange rates suffices for dynamic efficiency 
when countries run disparate generational deficits. A surprising implication of this 
analysis is that some xchange rates support allocations that are in the core of the 
world economy. Thus my analysis gives the first rigorous theoretical justification of 
Mundell's [22] classic observation about a system of fixed exchange rates, and 
I show why it is in the interest of one government to sacrifice its own policy 
independence. Moreover, the efficiency criterion I analyze can be tested empirically 
by checking whether countries in a system of fixed exchange rates have stocks of 
national (generational) debt whose present values are co-integrated, 
Here is the intuition. Consider a world economy with a fixed stream of 
endowments and a given profile of national generational deficits. Different exchange 
rates give rise to different real values of generational deficits and real interest rates. 
Not every such profile supports an efficient consumption path. As we shall see 
below, exchange rates that divide the seigniorage from the creation of international 
reserves help ensure the dynamic efficiency of the world economy. 
The model here is based upon that developed in Fisher [14], which is in turn an 
extension of the model developed by Balasko and Shell [5] and [6]. Agents have 
completely heterogeneous ndowments and preferences; hence, agents differ across 
countries as well as through time. There are no restrictions on trade in goods or 
assets at any time. To the best of my knowledge, this is the most general model of 
overlapping enerations that has been used in international finance. 2
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the 
model. The third section characterizes equilibria with international generational 
policies, and the fourth describes aspects of the relationship between exchange rates 
and economic efficiency. The fifth section gives two examples of international 
economies where determinate exchange rates divide the gains from trade, and the 
sixth section presents my conclusions and an agenda for future empirical research. 
2. The model 
I extend the fundamental papers of Balasko and Shell [5] and [6] by assuming that 
there are several gents in each generation, with each agent living for two periods) 
The agents alive at the beginning of the economy live for only one period. Goods 
z There has been almost no literature on dynamic efficien y ininternational economics, although Buiter 
[9] is a notable exception. Still, most research using overlapping generations i  international economics 
has been accomplished with diagrammatic analysis or with analytical solutions to simple difference 
equations. Hence, it has concentrated exclusively on stationary economies. 
3 The fact that these agents live for only two periods i not as restrictive asit seems. Balasko, Cass, and 
Shell [4] give an algorithm for transforming an arbitrary model of overlapping generations i to the one 
we use here by a labeling convention on dated commodities. Benveniste [8] is careful to explain that this 
algorithm has implications for how one might define the inter-temporal efficiency condition. 
cannot be stored, and at least two fiat assets erve as a store of value. Agents have 
heterogeneous preferences and endowments, and g goods are available in each 
period. Each agent has smooth, convex, and monotone preferences, and the closure 
of her indifference surfaces are contained in the positive orthant of ~-dimensional or 
2~%dimensional Euclidean space. Further, each agent is endowed with strictly 
positive amounts of every good in each period of her life, and she may receive taxes 
or transfers from different fiscal authorities. 4 
The set of people born at time t is G~, and N t = #G t < Go. Then 
G= UG t 
t=o 
is the index set of agent in the world economy. A list of countries is a partition of this 
set. There are ~ > 2 different countries, each with its own fiat asset. Let 
= { G 1 .... , G ~'} partition G; then agent hE G ~ is a resident of the j-th (and only the 
j-th) country. The set agents alive at time t is G t ~ G t_ 1, and he G j c~ G~ is a resident of 
country j born at time t. Although the world population may vary from period to 
period, there is always an agent trading with another person who will survive her. 
I will call the m fiscal authorities governments. 
It will be convenient to represent commodity bundles, prices, and government 
policies as sequences. The allocation of agent h~G~ is 
_ t t+ l  x -(0 . . . . .  x ,x h ,0 . . . .  ), 
where x~, 'i is her allocation of good i at time t and x~e R~+. Likewise, her endowment 
is 
=(0 . . . . .  . . . .  ), 
with c9~,~R~ +. So the space of commodity bundles is 
X = R N~ • ~2N~t • ~2NJ  • + ~ o~+ . . . .  
and the list of endowments for the world economy is co = (coh)heG~X. Note that I am 
using the index set of agents here. 
Since there is more than one country, the description of lump-sum transfers is 
more complicated than the usual case. Let m~ 'i be agent h's receipts of fiat asset j at 
time t; if inks<0, then agent h is taxed in asset j at time t. For h~G o, let 
1 1,1 m h = (mh , . .., m~'~)~ % where the j-th element of this vector denotes receipts at 
( t t+  1]~: [~2~ Again, time t of type-j assets. For any h~ G\G o, such transfers are ~mh, rn h  . . . . .  
m h (0,... ~ t+l ,, ~--- ~ mh~ YtZ h , t /~ . . . ) .  
An international policy is the full list m = (mh)h~ 6. Note that we are considering 
policies that give all types of assets to all kinds of people. 
The agents in the world economy can create as many inside assets of any 
denomination as they may please. Let y~'J be the gross additions at time t tothe type-j 
assets ofh~Gt, with y~EN ~ the corresponding vector. I impose that y~ _> 0 for h~G o 
4 These assumptions are sufficient to ensure the existence of an equilibrium without fiat assets in the 
discussion below. 
and y~,+y~--1 >0 for h~GkG o. These vector-valued inequalities state that no 
one can die a net debtor in any asset and no one holds assets when she is not alive. 
Again 
Yh = (0,..., y~, y~+ 1,0,...). 
represents the incremental asset holdings of agent he G r 
I consider the set of perfectly foreseen present value commodity prices with the 
normalization pl,1 = 1. A sequence of goods prices is 
p = (pl,p2 .... ) 
where pteR~++ and pe~,  the set of present-value prices. Then pi,~/pt,i is 
commodity i's own rate of interest between periods 1 and t. Let q"~ > 0 be the price of 
type-j assets at time t, and let q'e~r + be the vector of all m such prices. 5 The 
sequence of such prices is 
q=(q l ,q2  .... ) 
and qe..~, the set of present-value asset prices. Since the price of each asset is strictly 
positive, any bilateral exchange rate is well defined. Moreover, asset prices are not 
otherwise restricted because no further normalization is warranted without loss of 
generality in the analysis below. 
Agent h~GkG 0 has utility function �9 2~e u h. ~ + ~ ~ and maximizes: 6 
t t+ l  
Uh(Xh, X h ) (1) 
subject o 
P'Xh + q'Yh <- P'O)h + q 'mh = Wh, 
Xh>_O, and y~+y~+l>_0,7 
where w h is the present value of her wealth, including the taxes and transfers that 
accrue during the course of her life. All of these inner products are well defined 
because only finitely many elements of x h, Yh, COh, and m h are not zero. 
Define the aggregate supply of type-j assets in period t as: 
t 
M'J=Z Z 
s = 1 h~GswGs- i  
where m~'J~ . Further, write Mt~ R ~ as the vector of asset supplies at time t, and let 
M = (M 1, m 2 . . . .  ). Also, let the sequence 
yh=(0,  " t t - -  t+l ,~ �9 ",O, Yh, Yh+Yh ,U . . . .  ) 
describe the cumulative asset holdings of agent h. 
The following concept is useful. 
5 The restriction that each asset price is strictly positive is quite important. It entails that each country's 
policy plays a non-trivial role in determining the equilibrium allocations in the world economy. 
6 Agent hEG o has a utility function Uh:~e+ ---" ~. 
7 The problem for h~G o is analogous, and weimpose that yh ~ ------ 0eR ". 
Definit ion 1: A perfect foresight equilibrium with valuedfiat assets is a list of goods 
prices p~,  asset prices q~,  allocations x - (Xh)heG,  and cumulative asset holdings 
Y - (Yh)h~ such that: (i) x h solves (1); (ii) Zh~GXh <__ ~h~a~h; and (iii) Y~h~a Yh <- M. 
Condition (ii) describes material balances; it is an infinite-dimensional vector- 
inequality stating that aggregate demand for each dated commodity not exceed 
aggregate supply. Condition (iii) describes equilibrium in asset markets; it too is an 
infinite-dimensional inequality describing the demand for the stocks of assets and 
their supplies. 
We now state our first proposition. 
Proposi t ion 1: Consider a world economy associated with o~6X and international 
policy ~sM.  Let pE~ be a sequence of good prices in a perfect foresight equilibrium 
with valued fiat assets. Then the present prices of the fiat assets atisfy q = (qO qO .. . .  ), 
where qO6E~j:+. Hence, in such an equilibrium, all bilateral exchange rates are 
constant. 
Proof: The fact that all present value asset prices are constant follows from Balasko 
and Shell E6, Proposition 3.1]. Note that the exchange rate of currency k in terms of 
currency j is e t 'k ' j  = q~,k/qtd. Since qt,~ > 0 for all t and j, the Proposition follows. [] 
Proposition 1 states that each nominal exchange rate is constant; this is an 
implication of a perfect foresight equilibrium. The normalization that p l ,a= 1 
entails that the present value of an exchange rate is constant; hence, uncovered 
interest parity holds. 8 Proposition 1 does not imply that real exchange rates are 
constant. The definition of a real exchange rate in a model this general would entail 
a price index of traded and not-traded goods for each of the different countries. 9 
Only by a fluke would such an index be constant for any one country. 
Proposition 1 defines ~ (~-1)  bilateral exchange rates. Since qO,j/qO,k= 
e Lk = lie k'j, not all of these exchange rates are independent. Indeed, using arguments 
involving triangular arbitrage, one can show that only m - 1 of these exchange rates 
are independent. We have set up a rich enough structure to analyze the central 
theoretical issue of this paper. 
3. Equil ibria with international generat ional  pol icies 
In this section, we shall show how equilibrium in the goods market depends upon 
the generational policies adopted by all countries. The intuition is that a government 
increases the purchasing power of those to whom it gives lump-sum transfers, as 
long as its expansion is not so egregious as to destroy the value of its fiat asset. 
Let pE~, and recall that the present value of agent h's wealth is: 
w h = p.c% + q.m h 
8 Since this model admits inside as ets, there is no difference between uncovered and covered int st 
parity in a perfect foresight equilibrium. 
9 Let dated commodity (t, ) be a not-traded good in country j. Then condition (ii) of Definition 1 is 
it " t,i < t,i necessary but not sufficient for equilibrium. It would have to be replaced w h.Zh~JXh __Zh~Gjmh for 
each such dated commodity. 
Again, these expressions are well defined because only finitely many elements of 
COh and m a are not-zero. Since asset prices are constants, the present value of h's 
wealth depends only upon the sum of transfers that he receives. It is convenient to 
define: 
�9 ~m l ' j  if heG o 
[ZJh-'=[mth'J-t-mth+ l'J if heG\G o. 
Of course, #h e R ~ is the vector of transfers accruing to agent h. Let #~ = (#~)h~G be the 
generational policy ofcountry j .1 o The conventional  measure of a government deficit 
is derived from (mt J, mt+l'J)heG , but the real effect of government j 's pol icy is 
determined by #J = (/~)h~G. An international generational policy is a list of m different 
sequence #= {#1 . . . .  ,/~..z}. Let J// be the set of such policies. These policies are 
general enough so that countries may tax or subsidize every he G. 11 
Now let 6~={(p ,q) lpe~ and qe~}, and recall qt=qt+l  =q0 in a perfect 
foresight equil ibrium. The demand of h at time t is a function f~:9  ~ x N+ ~ Rt+, 
derived as the solution to (1) for a given pe9  ~ and w h = P'COh q- qO't2he ~+" Then 
fh(p, Wh) (0 . . . . .  ' W ~'t+ll. W ~ 0 . . . .  ) = fh(P, h) ' Jh  I, IJ' h]' 
describes h's demands. The material  balances condit ion is: 
Z L(p, w,) <_ y. co,. 
h~G h~G 
This vector inequality is infinite-dimensional, nd each of its elements i well defined 
because only finitely many of the elements of fh(P, %)  and co h are not zero and 
N t =- #G t is finite for all t. 
Now let 6e(co,/z) denote the set of perfect foresight equi l ibr ium prices support ing 
some equi l ibr ium consistent with the endowments coeX and internat ional  genera- 
t ional po l i cy /~ Jr Further,  let 
r = (r  1, r . . . .  ) = y .  
h6G 
be the stream of resources in the world economy. Consider a list of incomes 
w = (Wh)h~ G and pe~.  Then we can define the following useful concept: 
Definition 2: The sequence (p, w) is a price-income quilibrium associated with world 
resources r if and only if Zh~G fh(P, %)  = r. For  co e X, the international  generational 
po l i cy /~e J / i s  consistent with the price-income quilibrium (p, w) if and only if there is 
a q~ + such that w h = p'o9 h -}- qO'12 h for heG.  
lo This is the terminology ofAuerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff [2]. It is important for both theoretical 
and empirical reasons. By now it is well known that the conventional government deficit is not well 
defined. Moreover, any econometric test based on the Theorems below must recognize that generational, 
not conventional, deficits determine the dynamic efficiency of the equilibrium allocations in the world 
economy. 
11 C~nsider mthJ > 0 where h~ G~c~ Gk. This subsidy appears ~n c~untry f s current acc~unt as a uni~atera 1 
transfer to abroad, and its present value is q~163 J. In practice, these transfers can be quite substantial. Net 
unilateral transfers of the United States were more than ten percent of the external deficit in recent 
years. 
Define A ~ = Z] :  0 ~h~G~ #h, (roughly) the vector of liquidity that has been injected 
until time t. The present value of this liquidity is q~ The following proposition 
characterizes the international generational policies that are consistent with a given 
price-income equilibrium. 
Proposition 2: The international generational policy #~d// is consistent with the 
price-income equilibrium (p, w) if and only if: 
_ff+l. ~ fh I(P, Wh) <q~ t+ 2 fh (P, Wh) �9 (3) 
\ h~G~+ ~ \ hr:Gt 
Proof." This is an implication of Fisher [14, Proposition 6]; the argument isa simple 
extension of Balasko and Shell ['6, Proposition 5.5]. [] 
I am actually interested in describing the properties of 5P(co, #), but it is not at all 
easy to determine whether this set is empty in a model this general. That is why we 
use the concept of a price-income equilibrium. If # = 0 trivially, then there is enough 
structure on this economy to show that there is an equilibrium. Since no agent's 
wealth is affected by the prices of the different assets for any q~ +, 
(p,q)ss ~ZL In general, it is not possible to describe 5r explicitly; 
instead, we show below that special generational policies #e,# are consistent with 
a price-income equilibria (p, w) whose allocations are efficient. Then we explore the 
circumstances under which one vector of exchange rates suffices to guarantee the 
efficiency of these allocations. 
4. Equilibrium exchange rates 
Consider the world economy (co, p) and assume that Y(co,#)r Let 
QO(co.#) __ N2 + be the set of all asset prices giving rise to some (p,q)ESP(co,#). 
QO(co, #) is not empty because 5P(co, #) r ~Z~. We are interested in the dimension of 
QO(co,/0; if dim Q(co, ~) > 1, then there are several vectors of the m - i independent 
exchange rates that are consistent with some perfect foresight competitive equilib- 
rium. Kareken and Wallace have already shown that the exchange rate is indetermi- 
nate for the Samuelsonian equilibria in one class of stationary economies. 
Let qO~QO(co, #). Then it is easy to recover the m - 1 independent exchange rates 
by the function g: QO _~ {1} x ~'; + whose rule is: 
g(qO) = (1, qO,Z/qO.1 .... , qO,~/qO,1). 
We are particularly interested inwhether Q~ #) is contained in a one-dimensional 
linear sub-space of R% § in which case the exchange rates in the world economy are 
determinate. 
Even though the equilibrium exchange rates are constant, he vector of exchange 
rates influences equilibrium allocations i  two ways. First, exchange rates have 
effects on the distribution of consumption within each generation. Second, they 
re-allocate consumption between generations. 
We state now a proposition concerning the first effect. 
Proposition 3: Assume that Ar #) r $2~. If  the elements of# are not linearly indepen- 
dent, then dim ~o(co, #) > 1. 
Proof: Let (p,q)eSP(o~,#)~ ~. Consider the corresponding price-income quilib- 
rium (p, w), with w h = p.o.) h + qO "#h" Since the elements of# are not linearly indepen- 
dent, there is some m x 1 vector c~ ~ 0 such that ~'#h = 0 for all hoG. But then 
Wh = p.o) h + qO "#h = P'O3h + (qO § ~)'#h = P'(~h § (qO § 2~).#h 
for some 2>0.  Since q~ there is a continuum of 2>0 such that 
(qO + 2e)e Re; + and qO + 2e is consistent with (p, w). Hence, dim Q~ #) > 1. [] 
Consider an economy with red and blue assets. Each agent receives a tax or 
transfer imposed in strict proportions of one red note and one blue note. Since 
p 1,1 = 1, the num6rarire might well be a pound of sterling silver at time 1 (1699, say, 
when Sir Isaac Newton became master of the mint). Then it does not matter if the 
red note is worth three pounds sterling and the blue note seven or if both notes are 
worth five pounds sterling. The exchange rate is entirely indeterminate since 
dim Q~ #) -- 2. 
When will the elements of # be linearly independent? One common assumption 
in international economics is that each agent receives transfers in only one currency. 
Then the elements of # are certainly linearly independent and exchange rates affect 
the distribution of resources within each generation. Another possibility is a repre- 
sentative-agent model with disparate patterns of currency transfers. Then exchange 
rates influence the rate of increase of asset balances in the world economy. 
In exploring inter-temporal efficiency in the rest of this paper, we will impose 
Malinvaud's [21] condition that lim inft_.~[]ptl] =0.12  Postulating that 
lim inft~ oo 11 pt 11 = 0 entails that every commodity's own-rate of interest is eventually 
positive. If world resources are uniformly bounded, then interest rates are greater 
than the long-run growth rate of the world economy. We now state our first 
important result. 
Theorem 1: Assume that there is a uniform bound on world resources. Let 
lim inft_. ~ A t = A. If(p, q)~ S~ (~o, 12) # ~j satisfies lim inft_, ~ 11 pt 11 = 0, then the m - 1 
exchange rates satisfy [g(qO)-] .A = 0. 
Proofi Let r be the stream of world resources, and let K be a uniform upper bound 
on [I rt [[. Since Y(co,12) is not empty, Q~ is also not empty, and there is 
a price-income (p, w) equilibrium satisfying (3). Then the goods market equilibrium 
implies that: 
t W t. t W Iq~ Pt ' [h~ fh(P, h)],,,,,P [ ,~fh(P ,  h)]H } 
< [Ipt'rtll < I]rtH Ilptll <gl lptN. 
Since l imin f~l lp t l l=O,  liminft~o~]q~ Since Q~ is not empty, 
qO,1 > O. Hence, (q~176 = O. [] 
12 Here 1[ pt 11 denotes the Euclidean orm of the vector pr. In order to describe necessary and sufficient 
conditions for efficiency, one must impose further assumptions about he curvature ofthe economy's 
feasible sets, as in Cass [ 10] and Benveniste [81 or about that ofconsumers' indifference surfaces, as in 
Balasko and Shell [5]. 
If (p, q)eS(co, #) satisfies lim inft_~  It p' J] = 0, then the world economy is in what 
Gale [16] called the "classical case" and the present value of the stock of the world 
generational debt is retired asymptotically.13 It is important to emphasize that these 
kinds of equilibria do permit positive stocks of generational debt in each period in 
the world economy, although some agent must be taxed eventually in order to 
amortize the international generational debt. Thus, if A # 0~N '~, Theorem 1 im- 
poses a linear restriction on the set of asset prices ~~ p). It does not state that 
Q~ t0 lies in a one-dimensional sub-space of N'; +, but dynamic efficiency implies 
that exchange rates lie in a linear sub-space of N'; + whose dimension is no greater 
than ~n - 2. Hence exchange rates are not entirely indeterminate. 
The next concept illustrates some interesting implications of Theorem 1. 
Definition 3: #J is frequently balanced if and only if lim inf,_ ~ A tJ = O. 
This is akin to the terminology of Balasko and Shell [7]. If a generational policy is 
not frequently balanced, then a country's debt or surplus is permanent. The beauty 
of a model with m > 2 assets is that there may be several elements of/~, none of which 
is frequently balanced, and yet lira inf~_,~o [g(qO)].A ~ = 0. 
We state: 
Corollary 1.1: Consider a world with two countries. Assume that there is a uniform 
bound on world resources and that (p, q)~CJ(o9, I~) # (2~ satisfies lim inf,_. ~o f[ pt l[ = O. 
Then: (/) f l im inft_~  A t'~ > O, then lira inft_~  A t'2 < 0; and (ii) / f l imt .  ~ A t'I # 0 and 
limt_.~ A t'2 exists, then the exchange rate is unique. 
Proof: To show (i), let l im in f t _~At ' l=A 1 and let A 2 be analogous. Since 
5~(c0, #) # ~,  there is a q~ satisfying (3). Theorem 1 implies that ta  t '2~ has 
an accumulation point A 2such that q~ + q~ = 0; hence, A 2 < 0. To estab- 
lish (ii), let lim~_~ A t'~ = A ~ ~ O. Note that l im~ ~ A ~'2 = A z # 0 because both q0,a 
and qO,2 are strictly positive and q~ 1 + qO,2A2 = 0. Hence, e 2"~ = - A 1/Aa. [] 
Assume that there is a perfect foresight equilibrium that supports efficient 
allocations. If one government conducts an expansionary generational policy, then 
the other must conduct a contractionary one, and the exchange rate is determi- 
nate) r The latter government keeps asset balances within appropriate bounds for 
world economy. This argument has the flavor of Mundell's classic redundancy 
argument [22]; one fiscal authority "sacrifices" its independence in order to keep the 
equilibrium allocations of all agents in the world economy efficient. In a system of 
fixed exchange rates, one country must run generational surpluses if some country 
runs a policy that is not frequently balanced. 
53 Esteban and Millfin [13] use the analogous terminology that the equilibrium allocations are in the 
"classical set." 
~4 The expansionary country runs generational deficits, while the other country runs analogous 
surpluses. Building on the work of Auerbach and Kotlikoff [3], Fisher [15] shows that the conventional 
current account surplus is not well defined and then defines the aggregate g nerational current account 
surplus. There is strong evidence that countries run trade surpluses whose present value is not stationary 
over very long horizons. Such a phenomenon cannot be explained by models with infinitely lived agents 
when the usual transversality conditions are imposed. 
It is important to emphasize the intuition behind Corollary 1.1. An expansionary 
government creates too great an asymptotic supply of asset balances. If the other 
government did not "lean against he wind," then the equilibrium would not be 
efficient. Since there is free trade in all goods and assets, it is inappropriate to 
conclude that there is too much of any one asset; the problem is that there is too 
much of all types of assets unless another government corrects this imbalance. 
Following Chae and Esteban [12], we define another helpful concept. A coalition 
is a non-empty subset S___ G, the index set of agents. An assignment is a list of 
consumption bundles x = (Xh)h~ o, which may or may not be feasible. Then, for any 
coalition S and assignment xeX,  
= Iv~X:  ~, z h = v for some assignment z such that Fs(x) 
k heS 
"1 
Uh(Zh) > Uh(Xh) for all h~S and Uh(Zh) > Uh(Xh) for some heS t 
denotes the set of resources that can be distributed among the members of S such that 
no member of S is worse off and at least one member of S is strictly better off than is the 
case under the assignment x. Recall that co h is the endowment of agent h. We now state: 
Definition 4: An feasible allocation x belongs to the core if ~heS(Dh(Jfs(X) for any 
coalition S. 
Of course, an allocation xeX is in the core if it cannot be improved upon by any 
coalition. ~ 5 In the examples given below, we show that there are equilibria where 
countries run trade surpluses in order to maintain access to international capital 
markets. Even though there is imbalanced trade, the equilibrium allocations i  the 
world economy Pareto-dominate autarky. 
In fully dynamic international economies, there are two natural coalitions that 
might arise. The first is the set of agents in a generation, and the second is the full 
sequence of agents constituting a country. This observation allows us to state adeep 
concomitant of Theorem 1. 
Corollary 1.2: Let d = 1, and assume that there is a uniform bound on world resources. 
Consider (p, q)~Y(og, #). I f  the equilibrium allocations are in the core, then the ~ - 1 
exchange rates satisfy [9(q~ = 0. 
Proof: (By contradiction) Assume that [9(q~ r 0. Then Theorem 1 implies that 
there is a period T and an e > 0 such that, for all t _> T, pt > e. Equilibrium in the 
goods market for period t >_ T entails that 
Pt+ l I  ~' Xth+ ~ -- ~' OOth+ ~ l = hGt hEGt 
where x - -  (Xh)h~ G are the quilibrium allocations. 
is Hendricks, Judd, and Kovenock [17] gave the first example of Walrasian equilibrium allocations not 
in the (empty) core in a model of overlapping enerations. Kovenock [20] showed that there are 
Pareto-optimal Walrasian equilibrium allocations not in the (empty) core. Esteban and Mi11/m [13] 
showed that there are Pareto-optimal Walrasian equilibrium allocations in an economy whose core is not 
empty. 
If q~ > O, then for sufficiently large t 
2 (Dht+ 1 __ Z Xht+ i __> q~ - c51 > O. 
h~Gt+ 1 hEGt+ 1 
Consider the coalition S = ws~t+ 1Gs and assignment 
t+ l  t+ l  x h if heGt+ 1 and x h >_o h 
Zh~-  (0 . . . . .  X~ +1 t+2 t+ l  t+ l  +&l /#Gt+l ,Xh  ,0,...) if h~G~+ 1 and x h <co h 
and z h = Xh if heS\G,+ 1" Note that Y~h~sZh < Zh~SCO h and that Uh(Zh) >_ Uh(Xh) for all 
h~S, with at least one strict inequality. Hence, (Xh)h~ G is not in the core. 
If q~ < 0, then for sufliciently large t 
t + 1 (D~+ 1 
xh - Z 
hr~Gt h~Gt 
Now consider the coalition S = [jt= o G~ and assignment 
t+ l  ~ o ) t+ l  Xh if h~Gt and x h _ h 
2 'h~ / 0 t t+ l  t+ l  - -  t+ l  {. t . . . . .  Xh, Xh + c~2/#Gt, O,...) if heG~ and xh <% 
and Zh = Xh if h ~S\ G, Again, ~h~S Zh < 52h~S C% Uh(Zh) > Uh(Xh) for all he S, with at least 
one strict inequality, and thus (Xh)h~ Gis not in the core. [] 
The assumption that there is one good per period places this result firmly within 
the literature on aggregative conomics. Consider now a world economy with 
a non-empty core. Assume that one country creates uch a large asymptotic supply 
of its asset that the equilibrium allocations are not Pareto efficient. Then the 
countries in the world economy could agree on a different array of generational 
policies enhancing the distributive fficiency of the world economy. Such an 
agreement would be self-enforcing because the v ctor of exchange rates and the new 
policy support equilibrium allocations in the core of the world economy. 
There are world economies in which countries are willing to run generational 
surpluses in order to maintain access to international capital markets. This fact is at 
the essence of why a country would "sacrifice its policy independence" and run an 
external surplus. A surplus country maintains the dynamic efficiency of the world 
economy because access to the international trading system allows for a Pareto 
improvement over the allocations that it could achieve without international 
financial markets! 
Much of the literature on the core in a model of overlapping enerations has 
been concerned with convergence of the core to the set of Walrasian equilibrium 
allocations. Chae [11] and Aliprantis and Burkinshaw [1] are two important 
examples. But most important heoretical issues in international economics arise 
precisely because countries are atoms. Hence, in natural applications in interna- 
tional economics, the core of the world economy may be much larger than the set of 
competitive equilibrium allocations. This insight will be exploited in the examples 
below. 
If the stream of world resources i uniformly bounded, the Malinvaud criterion 
implies that (q~176176 has an accumulation point at zero. If there were only one k t=O 
asset in this model, then # would have to be frequently balanced. Since there are 
_> 2 assets, there may be several elements of # that do not have this property, but 
there may be linear combinations of these sequences that do. The reader familiar 
with time-series econometrics will see that the vector of asset prices serves as 
a co-integrating vector for the m-dimensional deterministic process (At)~=o . This 
allows us to state a surprising result. 
Theorem 2: Assume that 5Qe), #)v~ (2~ and that there is a uniform bound on world 
resources. I f  each (p, q)~ AQco, #) satisfies l iminft.co ]1 pt II = 0, then the dimension of 
Q~ #) is given by the number of co-integrating vectors of (At)~=o. 
Proof: Since 5~(co, #) is not empty, Q~ #) is also not empty. For  each q~176 #), 
there is a price-income (p, w) equil ibrium satisfying (3). Theorem 1 then implies that 
there is a subsequence of (At)~: o having an accumulation point at zero. Let {ei} ~= 2, 
with r N m, be linearly independent m x 1 vectors that span Q~ #). 
Now let A be the m x r matrix whose i-th column is e~. Consider a subsequence 
such that limk_, co A'A t~ = 0. The columns of A are the co-integrating vectors of the 
tk CO process (A)k  = 2. Since Q0((~, #) lies in the column space of A, dim Q~ #) = r. [] 
If dim Q~ #) = r < m, the series (At)~= o has m - r common trends, to use the apt 
terminology of Stock and Watson [-23]. In Corol lary 1.1, there is only one common 
trend in that two-dimensional process. This trend is the pattern of adjustment to the 
incipient asset market disequilibrium caused by the expansion inherent in one 
country's generational policy (or the contraction inherent in its trading partner's 
policy). Two examples in the next section provide deeper insight into these common 
trends. 
5. Applications 
The first example describes a world economy consisting of two countries with 
identical preferences but different endowments. International trade benefits benefits 
both countries, and there is a unique exchange rate that divides the gains from trade 
between the two countries. 
Example 1: Let ~ = 2 and N t = #G t = 2 for all t _> 0. Since ~ = Nt, we can identify 
sequences of agents with the government taxing them. The two agents in G t have 
identical homothetic preferences. There is a single good, and endowments are 
O3h=(1,0 .. . .  ) if h~Go~G 1, COh=(3,0 . . . .  ) if h~GonG 2, COb=(0 . . . . .  2,1,0 .. . .  ) if 
h~Gl\Go, and co h = (0 . . . . .  1, 3, 0 . . . .  ) if h~G2\Go . Preferences are given by: 
t+ l ) :  Uh(X~)=Iogx ~ i fhsG o andUh(Xth, Xh (1/2)logx~ +(1/2)logx~ +1 i fhsG\G o. 
Then p = (1,3/4,9/16 .. . .  ) supports an efficient equilibrium with no outside 
assets. The equil ibrium allocations atisfy (x~, x~ + 1) = (11/8, 11/6) for he G 2 \G  O and 
t t+ 2~ (13/8, 13/6) for h~G2\Go . Country 1 has a trade deficit in every period, X h, X h J : 
and free trade Pareto-dominates autarky. 26 The agents in Country 1 lend to their 
counterparts in Country 2; since the lenders receive interest payments in old age, 
16 The autarkic equilibrium in country 1 is supported by p =(1,2,4,...) and that in country 2 is 
supported by p = (1~ 1/3, 1/9,...). 
country 1 runs a trade deficit owing to its surplus on interest income from 
abroad. 
Now consider (At)t=o with A~176 and A"l=52~s=o(3/4) s and 
At '2=-Zts=o(3 /4)s  for t_>l. This sequence is generated by the policy 
#h = ((3/4)t, 0) ' if heG1~ G t and #h = (0 , -  (3/4)t) ' if heGZn Gt, with t > 1. If qO is 
collinear with (1, 1)', then q~ = 0 for all t, and p = (1, 3/4, 9/16,.. ) still supports an 
equilibrium. Further, e 2'1 = 1 is the only exchange rate such that lim~ooq~ t = 0. 
This international generational policy clearly benefits the residents of Country 
1 since it allows them to run a larger trade deficit. But, if qO,1 = qO.2 < x/3/12 ' then 
the equilibrium allocations Pareto-dominate those in autarky and are in the core of 
the world economy. 
Country 1 in autarky constitutes a Samuelsonian economy, and the coalition 
consisting of all the agents in G 1 can achieve the feasible allocation x h = 3/2 for 
heG 1 c~ G O and x h = (3/2, 3/2) for heGl \Go  . It is possible to show that the agents in 
G 1 can block any allocation that entails their running a perpetual trade surplus. On 
the other hand, Country 2 in autarky is a classical economy, and those agents can 
form no coalition allowing them to run a perpetual trade deficit. Since international 
trade Pareto-dominates autarky, the government ofCountry 2 is willing to increase 
its trade surplus and accommodate the expansion in Country 1. Finally, note that if 
Country 2 did not run generational surpluses, then the generational deficits Country 
1 would not be consistent with asset market equilibrium because the world economy 
is in a classical equilibrium! 
The second example illustrates the existence of a unique vector of exchange rates 
in a three-country world. It hinges upon the fact that the fiscal authorities manipu- 
late their stocks of national generational debt in cycles of surpluses and deficits. The 
cycles are not synchronized, and there is a unique vector of exchange rates insuring 
the dynamic efficiency of the world economy. The different patterns of adjustment to 
external deficits are the two common trends determining the exchange rates in the 
world system. 
Example 2: Let ~ = 3 and N t =-- 3 for all t _> 0, and identify sequences of agents 
with the authority taxing them. Again, there is a single good per period, and the 
three agents in G t have the same homothetic preferences given in Example 1. 
Now endowments are co h=(1,0 .... ) if beg oc~G I, co h=(3/2,0,...) if 
he G O c~ (G 2 • G3) ,  09 h = (0  . . . . .  2, 1, 0 .... ) if he G 1 \Go, and co h = (0,..., 1/2, 3/2, 0,...) if 
he(G 2 w G3)\Go . 
Again, p =(1,3/4,9/16 .... ) supports an efficient equilibrium without assets. 
Equilibrium allocations satisfy (x~, X~h+l)=(l l /8,  11/6) for heGlkGo and 
(x~, x~ + 1) = (13/16, 13/12) for he(G 2 w G3)\Go . 
Now consider (At)~=o with A~ =A~ =A~ and At'l--~2,t=o (3/4). 
[sin(rcs/2) + cos6zs/2)], A t'2 = - )Zt, = o (3/4)s[(1/3)sin(rcs/2) + cos(ns/2)], and 
A"3 = - Zts = o (3/4)~[sin(Tzs/2) + (1/3) cos (zcs/2)] for t > 1. This sequence is generated 
by the unusual generational policy: 
(((3/4) 1[-sin (7ct/2) + cos (Trt/2), 0, 0)' if h e G 1 c~ Gt 
#h = t (0, -- (3/4)t[-(1/3) sin(~t/2) + cos(rot/2)], 0)' if heG 2 c~ G t 
{ (0,0, -- (3/4)t[sin(rct/2) + (1~3)cos(rot~2)])' if heG 3 c~ G~ 
all with t >_ 1. If qO is collinear with (1, 3/4, 3/4)', then q~ 0 for all t, and 
p =(1,3/4,9/16 .... ) still supports the equilibrium. Further, e2'1= eS'l= 3/4 and 
e s'2 = 1 are the only exchange rates such that limt._,ooq~ t = 0.17 
Again, for sufficiently small qO, 1 > 0, the equilibrium allocations Pareto-domi- 
nates those in autarky for all three countries. These cyclical deficits and surpluses 
are in the core of the world economy. 
The second example illustrates a compelling interpretation fa common trend. 
Fiat assets given to Ms. h causes a generational current account deficit for the 
country where she resides. If the equilibrium is efficient, then this deficit must 
eventually be "financed" by the accumulation of "foreign exchange reserves" by 
some other country. A common trend is a pattern that divides the seigniorage from 
the creation of international asset balances. A unique vector of exchange rates 
implies af ixed pattern for these trade balances. Let kt be such that (A t+ ~ 'j - A t'j) = 1; 
then, if exchange rates are unique, the ~ - 1 common trends describe precisely the 
long-run accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by the ~-  1 other govern- 
ments. These trends are description of how the specie-flow mechanism is enforces 
the adjustment ecessary to keep the equilibrium allocations in the core of the world 
economy. A unique exchange rate, then, represents he pattern of absorption of the 
specie outflow induced by a country's expansion and its concomitant generational 
current account deficit. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has shown that there is a relationship between efficiency, exchange rates, 
and international co-operation i a world with many fiat assets. I emphasized that 
the generational policy of any one country influences agents everywhere through the 
effects it has on the evolution of present prices in the world economy. The emphasis 
on efficiency enabled us focus attention upon a subset of asset prices for the world 
economy. 
Using the Malinvaud criterion and placing a uniform bound on world resources, 
we showed that the vector of exchange rates is not fully indeterminate. We 
emphasized that an equilibrium satisfying this criterion may support allocations in 
the core of the world economy. Hence, there may be an ineluctable lement of 
co-operation i herent in an international system. Indeed, in the examples in the last 
section, there was a unique vector of exchange rates that supported efficient 
equilibrium allocations.19 
I have shown elsewhere [14] that countries need not have balanced trade in an 
economy with fixed exchange rates. This paper emphasizes that a system of fixed 
17 Here I am obviously using that sin(~t/2) and cos(nt/2) are orthogonal. 
t8 See Ibn Khaldoun [18] for an early discussion of this idea. 
19 The ideas in this paper generalize to a wider class of equilibria if one is willing to place assumptions on 
the curvature of consumers' indifference surfaces in a subset of the commodity space. Then one could 
prove theorems describing necessary and sufficient conditions for dynamic efficiency in terms of rates of 
increase of each country's generational debt and a corresponding vector of equilibrium exchange rates, 
This generalization would include the Samuelsonian cases for the world economy, but it would not much 
enhance the reader's insight in o the nature of international generational policies. 
exchange rates can maintain the efficiency of equilibrium allocations as long as 
countries "agree" on a pattern of generational trade imbalances. Moreover, there is 
a surprising connection between the number of unit roots in the present value of 
stocks of national debt and the dimension of the set of exchange rates, a finding 
having obvious empirical implications. Testing these hypotheses using data from the 
regime of fixed exchange rates in the last two centuries is an open area of research. 
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